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Abstract
This text presents a first attempt to define aesthetics as a variety of cognition. Due to the 
inaugural character of this essay it merely outlines key ideas in this regard. It maps out a 
territory which begins to emerge through the landmarks that delineate it and will be precisely 
realized in the coming years. This essay is structured in three parts. The first summarizes the 
main traits of a concept of cognition rooted in the theory of autopoiesis and developed in the 
framework of the enactive approach. This concept differs radically from its common twofold 
meaning: the explicit or implicit production or acquisition of knowledge about an object or a 
state of affairs by a subject or a group of subjects through the performance of mental skills or 
the development of certain skills in order to perform a task. This notion of cognition expands 
in the enactive context towards its identification with a concept of life, defined as a process 
of sense-making. In the second part, the enactive concept of cognition provides a foundation 
for my definition of a cognitive notion of aesthetics. Whereas cognition will be outlined as the 
actualization of a self-sustaining network of shared agencies, aesthetics will be fundamentally 
described as a mode of action – aesthetic conduct – ie, as a form of participation in the 
actualization of this network. After characterizing this variety of active engagement with the 
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world, its function in the general context of cognition will be specified: aesthetic conduct enables 
the disclosure of new fields of intelligibility, to new possibilities of understanding. The third 
section shows how this embodied and situated concept of aesthetics clarifies the position of 
aesthetic research in the context of other forms of inquiry.
Keywords
aesthetics, embodied and situated cognition, enactivism 
Estética corporeizada y situada
Un enfoque enactivo a una noción cognitiva de estética
Resumen
Este texto presenta un primer intento de definir la estética como un tipo de cognición. 
Debido al carácter inaugural de este ensayo, solo esboza ideas claves a este respecto, 
traza un territorio que comienza a emerger a través de los referentes que lo delinean y que 
se materializará de forma precisa en los próximos años. Este ensayo se estructura en tres 
partes. La primera resume los rasgos característicos de un concepto de cognición anclado 
en la teoría de la autopoiesis y desarrollado en el marco del enactismo. Este concepto 
difiere radicalmente de su doble significado habitual: la producción o adquisición explícitas 
o implícitas de conocimiento sobre un objeto o una situación, por parte de un sujeto o grupo 
de sujetos, mediante el uso de habilidades mentales o del desarrollo de ciertas habilidades 
para realizar una tarea. Esta noción de cognición se expande en el enactismo para identifi-
carse con un concepto de vida, definido como un proceso de producción de sentido. En la 
segunda parte, el concepto enactivo de cognición fundamenta mi definición de una noción 
cognitiva de estética. Mientras que la cognición se define como la actualización de una red 
autosuficiente de agencias compartidas, la estética se define básicamente como un modo de 
acción -conducta estética-, es decir, como una forma de participación en la actualización de 
esta red. Tras caracterizar esta variedad de participación activa con el mundo, se especifica 
su función en el contexto general de la cognición: la conducta estética posibilita el despliegue 
de nuevos campos de inteligibilidad, de nuevas posibilidades de comprensión. La tercera 
parte muestra como este concepto situado y corporeizado de estética clarifica la posición 
de la investigación estética en el contexto de otras formas de investigación.
Palabras clave
estética, cognición corporeizada y situada, enactivismo
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This text presents a first attempt to specify the cognitive function of 
aesthetics or, to put it in more radical terms, to define aesthetics as 
a variety of cognition.1 Due to the inaugural character of this essay 
which, although rooted in my former work,2 delves into new research 
territory, it merely outlines key ideas. It maps out a territory which 
begins to emerge through the landmarks that delineate it. Accordingly, 
this text does not include detailed arguments about the proposed 
ideas. It simply defines the infrastructure of a conceptual construction 
that will be enabled and put in place over the coming years.
This endeavor is framed by the so-called theories of embodied 
and situated cognition and more specifically the enactive approach.3 
According to the first, cognition takes place due to two necessary 
conditions: the activities of bodies – biologically realized organisms – and 
their entanglement with their surroundings. Cognition thus cannot occur 
on the basis of an ideal entity – eg a “pure mind” – in a vacuum or “neutral 
container”. The enactive approach specifies these basic conditions, 
defining the body as an autonomous system and its involvement with the 
environment as structural coupling. Furthermore, this cognitive approach 
explains the relationships between living units and their surroundings 
in terms of co-emergence: a dynamic and complex system of mutual 
determination between enabling conditions and emerging qualities.4
This essay is structured in three parts. The first summarizes 
the main traits of a concept of cognition rooted in the theory of 
autopoiesis and developed in the framework of the enactive approach. 
This concept differs radically from its common twofold meaning: the 
explicit or implicit production or acquisition of knowledge about an 
object or a state of affairs by a subject or a group of subjects – the only 
agents in this process – through the performance of mental skills such 
as attention, categorization, judgement, induction or deduction, or the 
development of certain skills in order to perform a task. This notion 
of cognition expands in the enactive context towards its identification 
with a concept of life, defined as a process of sense-making.
In the second part, the enactive concept of cognition provides a 
foundation for my definition of a cognitive notion of aesthetics. Whereas 
cognition will be outlined as the actualization of a self-sustaining 
network of shared agencies, aesthetics will be fundamentally described 
as a mode of action – aesthetic conduct – ie as a form of participation 
in the actualization of this network. After characterizing this variety of 
active engagement with the world, its function in the general context 
of cognition will be specified: aesthetic conduct does not produce 
stable and objectified conceptual presences of things and states of 
affairs to which it relates – it does not produce knowledge. Instead 
it destabilizes established phenomena, enabling the constitution of 
radical alternatives. Aesthetic conduct eventually enables the disclosure 
of new fields of intelligibility, to new possibilities of understanding. 
The third section shows how this embodied and situated concept 
of aesthetics clarifies the position of artistic research, or better, 
aesthetic research, in the context of other forms of inquiry. 
The enactive notion of cognition
One of the fundamental ideas of enactivism – the “big picture” one 
could say− is that selves and environments co-emerge. This means 
that the arising of a self – a clearly contoured, autonomous, self-
regulated unit, leading its own actions out of its self-determined inner 
organization – and of an environment – necessarily its environment: 
the domain of significance in and with which the self develops its 
autonomy – occurs simultaneously and in an intimate relationship 
of mutual determination: the self arises because the environment 
emerges, and the environment comes to be because the self arises. 
The enactive approach not only delivers this conceptual construct 
but also a fundamental explanation of its inner dynamics grounded 
in the biological organization of living units – their autopoiesis – and 
the way they relate to their physicochemical surroundings – their 
structural coupling. The core idea is twofold. The first aspect is that 
the defining trait of a living being is its own form for organization: a 
unit – a chronotopologically contoured entity, an enclosed system – 
can be considered to be alive when it generates and regenerates the 
own inner components that enable processes, which in turn generate 
and regenerate the components that allow those processes to occur.5 
This circular causality is denominated operational closure and it is the 
source of the living unit’s autonomy.6 The second aspect is that the 
living unit needs the exchange with its surroundings to be realized. 
The living unit is autonomous – this is the constitutive trait of its inner 
organization – but it is not independent: it depends on its surroundings 
to exist, to develop its organic dynamics and to realize itself. Both the 
living unit and its surroundings are structurally coupled: they condition 
mutually the actual expression of their respective organizations, ie 
their present states, their current presences. Expressed in terms of 
1.  Aesthetics was originally defined in epistemological terms by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in its Aesthetica, inaugurating a long and fruitful line of thought. My attempt to outlined 
aesthetics as a variety of cognition is embedded in this tradition but differs from it fundamentally due to the concept of cognition that I take as basis.
2.  See as a main reference my research project Architecture of Embodiment: <www.architecture-embodiment.org>.
3.  For a future development of this undertaking I will expand its conceptual base. In this initial moment, nevertheless, I consider enactivism a powerful conceptual framework to establish 
a solid link between aesthetics and life’s most fundamental dynamics.   
4.  For the first definition of this approach, see: Varela et al. (1991). For an exhaustive description, see: Thompson (2007).
5.  According to the original definition of autopoiesis, two further conditions are necessary for a unit to be autopoietic: the existence of a semi-permeable membrane and that this membrane 
is generated by the unit’s own processes. See: Maturana and Varela (1972).  
6.  For a clarification of the relationship between autopoiesis and autonomy, see the chapter “Life and Mind: the Philosophy of the Organism” in Thompson, op. cit.
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co-emergence: the specific way in which the autonomous unit and 
the components of its surroundings relate to one another configures 
the set of enabling conditions that allows the emergent qualities – the 
self and its environment, its world – to arise, constraining in turn the 
way the autonomous unit and the components of its surroundings 
behave with and to one another. 
Cognition in this conceptual framework is understood as the 
process of co-emergence that enables selves and environments to 
be constituted as significant presences out of the spontaneous and 
entangled development of the forms of organization of living units 
and their physicochemical surroundings. Cognition is the expression 
and the realization, or formulated in a compact way, the expressive 
realization of life’s own dynamics. To be more precise: cognition is the 
network of processes that ensure the viability of life’s own dynamics 
through their spontaneous and expressive realization. 
Obviously, the enactive concept of cognition implies an extension 
of the common meaning of this term. Cognition in this context is 
not reduced to the production, development or achievement of an 
explanation or a skill – in reference respectively to the concept 
of “knowing that” and “knowing how”7 – about something else: 
respectively an object or state of affairs or a task. Cognition is not 
reduced here to a mere question of problem-solving. To solve a concrete 
problem or to develop the necessary skills to do it configure specific 
aspects of cognition but define neither exhaustively nor fundamentally 
this term. The enactive concept of cognition refers to the fundamental 
activities of being alive, of finding ways to maintain life, to preserve the 
viability of the living unit’s active-being-in-the-world in and with the 
worlds that emerge out of life’s own processes, which simultaneously 
enable living units to achieve and maintain their own selfness. 
On this basis, I would like to extend one particular aspect of the 
enactive concept of cognition, emphasizing one of its underdeveloped 
aspects: the agency of heteropoietic units,8 which I have referred to 
so far as “components of the living unit’s surroundings”. Although, 
as already pointed out, structural coupling is one of the constitutive 
aspects of this approach – defined as such in the theory of autopoiesis9 
– in the context of enactivism it is rather the question of the living 
system’s autonomy that is stressed. For this reason one could think 
that the primary reason why cognition comes to be is the existence 
of autonomous units and thus that autonomy is the core and the 
beginning of cognition. The first part of the last assertion is true: there 
would not be cognition without autonomous units. But the second part 
is wrong as a consequence of a problematic habit of thought: to think 
that every process inevitably has to have a moment marked as “its 
beginning” and that the description or explanation of this process must 
refer necessarily to it and therefore begin there as well, ie begin with 
and from the beginning. This procedure can be appropriate in some 
cases but not when referring to the enactive concept of cognition. As 
already mentioned, circular causality10 is constitutive for this approach, 
and there is no beginning in a circle. Accordingly, autonomous units 
cannot be thought of as being the beginning, nor even the motor 
of cognitive processes, since they would not exist without being 
coupled with heteropoietic units: one exists because of the other. 
Whereas in the enactivist context there is no doubt about the agency 
of autonomous units, since their agency is a result of their autonomy, 
there is no reference to the possible agency of heteronomous entities, 
although they are constitutive for life and thus for cognition. There are 
good reasons, whose enumeration would exceed the frame of this 
text, to believe that the attribution of agency to those units is plausible 
according to the criteria established by the theory of autopoiesis 
as “non-living”, ie to consider heteronomously organized matter 
as a cognitive agent.11 This attribution goes beyond the concept of 
affordances,12 critically integrated in the enactive approach, and will 
reduce – if not eliminate – the asymmetry in the description of the 
participation of autonomous systems and heteronomous units in the 
processes of cognition. Accepting the attribution of agency to non-
living entities, it is possible to assert that cognition takes place in a 
field of shared agencies. Accordingly, cognition can be defined as a 
network of processes that actualizes these agencies in a relation of 
mutual contingency. Cognition is shared action. It is a self-organized, 
self-supporting and co-emerging network of conducts: of actions 
that are guided (-duct, from “ducere”: to guide) in common (con-).
Embodied and situated aesthetics
The extension of the concept of cognition caused by its identification 
with the enactive notion of life implies that every human activity can 
be specified as a variety of cognitive conduct. Every kind of human 
action, whether spontaneous or organized,13 participates unavoidably 
in the realization of life, ie in the expression of its dynamics as the 
 7.  In reference to Gilbert Ryle’s differentiation between two types of knowledge. See: Ryle (1949).
 8.  Whereas autopoietic units are self-organized, heteropoietic ones are organized and defined in relation to their chronotopograhic structure by external agents.
 9.  See footnote 6.
10.  I consider the so-called circular causality to be a logical construction able to express, approximately, simultaneity in the medium of discursive language.
11.  This idea is central in the so-called new materialism. See as a good example: Benett (2010). Referring to a particular kind of organized matter – pictures – see also: Bredekamp (2010).
12.  I refer to the concept of “affordances” as defined by: Gibson (1979).
13.  In this conceptual context, the possibility of a categorical distinction between these two terms is weakened by the idea that all varieties of human action are grounded on the inner 
organization of living system that perform them. Consequently also “organized” actions, i.e. actions explicitly structured by their actor, are “spontaneous”: they arise (“sponte“) out 
of their own constitution (“sua“).
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emergence of significances. On this basis, the definition of the unique 
and distinctive features of a field of human activity, eg aesthetics, 
fundamentally implies the specification of a variety of conduct, ie of 
a particular form of participation in the network of shared agencies 
that sustains life’s viability. Accordingly, the following two basic 
questions can be posed regarding every single case: first, what is 
the particular variety of conduct that specifies a kind of human activity, 
eg aesthetics, and therefore differentiates it from others, eg religion, 
sports or philosophy? And second, what is the specific contribution 
of this variety of conduct to the general field of cognition? In other 
words: what is the specific cognitive function of this concrete field 
of human action? Or also: how does aesthetic conduct contribute to 
maintaining life’s viability? In the following paragraphs I will succinctly 
address both questions in relation to aesthetics.
In this initial state of my inquiry I identify three fundamental 
characteristics of aesthetic conduct. The first relates to the kind of 
skills and organic dynamics that primarily support the performance 
of this variety of action. Although every organic process is involved in 
every action of the organism,14 aesthetic conduct is primarily enabled 
by our sensorimotor and emotional skills. The link between our 
sensory capacities and our abilities to move constitutes a basic system 
in the connective dynamics between us and our surroundings.15 Our 
sensory contact with our physicochemical context, enabled and 
enhanced by our capacity to move, which in turn is conditioned by 
our sensuous experience,16 continuously realizes not only one of the 
most fundamental forms of exchange between the autonomous unit 
and its surroundings17 but furthermore actualizes, or in a formulation 
already used here: expressively realizes, the boundary between both 
spheres, negotiating the dynamics of differentiation and connection 
that constitute it operatively. On a higher level of complexity, emotions 
– in terms of the etymological origin of the word: to move or to be 
moved from within – mobilize our organism in a holistic and basic 
way. Emotions are one of the fundamental dynamics that define the 
direction of our actions and thus co-constitute the valence with which 
our environment emerges. Attraction or repulsion, as basic possibilities, 
and all the subtly nuanced variations we enact, mark decisively the 
sense with which our environment appears to us. Without excluding 
other skills, aesthetic conduct is based on the performance of our 
sensorimotor and emotional skills: the basic connective dynamics 
between our fundamental self and our physicochemical surroundings. 
The second constitutive trait of aesthetic conduct, which is 
sustained by the former and reinforces its realization, is a strong 
restriction of target-oriented and will-based action. The skills of 
defining and fixing a goal and mobilizing our organic resources, 
and thus our actions, to achieve it, are constitutive of a variety of 
conduct that could be termed as “functional”. Proceeding in this 
way, our sensorimotor skills are subordinated to those able to define 
a task and accomplish it, and our emotions have to be sorted out: 
those that reinforce the achievement of the previously defined goal 
can be strengthened, or at least tolerated, and those that hinder its 
accomplishment should be repressed. By conducting our interaction 
with our surroundings functionally, ie setting a goal and arranging our 
actions to achieve it, the environment becomes a mere stage or a 
collection of means for the actualization of the only agency at stake: 
ours. Time becomes tense and acquires an instrumental character, as 
do our surroundings. It becomes a framework or a means with which 
to fulfill the purpose set by the former, ie non-present instant. On the 
contrary, by renouncing a strong purposiveness18 and the exercise 
of our will, we set free two intimately interwoven sets of agencies: 
the spontaneous agencies of our sensorimotor and emotional skills 
and the agencies of our surroundings. The non-tense variety of 
conduct based on these interdependent agencies, often qualified 
as “passive”,19 confers actuality and a substantial and autonomous 
presence to the environment and allows the appearance of qualities 
that might be radically different from those strongly predetermined 
by an intrinsically reductive entity: an objective – something we throw 
(-ject, from “jectere”: to throw) in front of ourselves (ob-).
The third basic characteristic of aesthetic conduct is a 
consequence of the former two and is therefore already implicit in 
their description: aesthetic conduct is constitutively receptive. As 
already posited, the reduction of purpose and will opens a space 
for a reinforced manifestation of the agencies of the environment 
that can be addressed, on the one hand, in an intensified and 
increasingly adaptive way and, on the other hand, less “colored” 
by our own autonomy – by our very specific “response” – through 
the predominant role of our sensorimotor and emotional skills. 
Without renouncing our own responsibility – to the specific ability to 
respond rooted in our fundamental autonomy – but rather extending 
the concept of responsibility by resituating it in a context of shared 
agency, aesthetic conduct does not tend to stamp our own (pre-)
conceptions on a presumably neutral environment. Instead, it 
allows for the spontaneous emergence of new “responses”, ie of 
14.  This idea was extensively formulated by Kurt Goldstein. See: Goldstein (2000).
15.  In this regard see: Noë (2004) and di Paolo et al. (2017).
16.  The relationship between movement and sensation can be also describe in terms of circular causality.
17.  Other basic dynamics are those related to respiration and nourishment, ie processes of metabolism. It would make sense to consider them in the attempt to define the notion of 
aesthetic conduct.  
18.  For an extensive reflection on purposiveness, its connection with the phenomenological concept of “intentionality” and the Kantian formulation “purposiveness without purpose”, see: 
Arteaga (2014). 
19.  See: Husserl (2001) and Bush and Draxler (2013).
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new autonomous actions, by virtue of an increased receptivity of the 
autonomous unit to the actualization of other agencies.
The former formulation anticipates the answer to the second 
question, the one referring to the specificity of aesthetic conduct 
and more concretely to its distinctive cognitive function. Aesthetic 
conduct does not contribute to sustaining life’s viability through the 
production of knowledge. This form of behavior leads directly neither 
to the generation by an individual of consolidated and stable, explicitly 
formulated conceptual artifacts that describe, define or explain a 
subject matter – an object or state of affairs – nor to the development 
of skills for the accomplishment of a particular task. Instead, it enables 
the destabilization of these kinds of steady, established, secured and 
habitualized entities. Prevailing and routine cognitive entities might 
be disrupted if we let ourselves be moved by our surroundings by 
relying on our basic connective dynamics. This disturbance facilitates 
the whole network of agencies that configure the dynamic system in 
which we participate spontaneously, ie according to its own dynamics. 
The cognitive function of aesthetics is, therefore, primarily negative. 
Obviously, I am using this term in an operative sense: aesthetic 
conduct contributes to the maintenance of life’s viability by not-
producing stability, furthermore by de-stabilizing, dis-rupting. In 
doing so, aesthetic conduct contributes to the emergence of the 
most fundamental conditions of possibility for a reestablishment of 
stabilities on a different substrate – this is the final positive character 
of the negative strategy. A substrate which, due to its common 
origin – the dynamics of radical sharing – might be more adjusted 
to and adequate for the current situation – the actual state of the 
whole system individual-environment. Destabilization is, therefore, a 
negative means for the positive function of aesthetic conduct in the 
general field of cognition: to facilitate radically alternative presences 
to arise – intentional presences as perceptions, concepts, categories 
or values and / or operative20 presences like varieties of inter-action or 
environments as such21 – by allowing a reorganization of the enabling 
conditions of the system of co-emergence. Aesthetic conduct is not 
productive but conductive: it allows for alternative forms of common 
action, of shared participation in life’s own sustaining dynamics.
If I formulate this conductive function not from a third-person-
perspective in relation to the whole system but from the point of view 
of the one who is acting aesthetically – from a first-person-perspective 
inside the system, although formulated in the following lines in a third-
person form – I would postulate that instead of achieving or producing 
knowledge, she, the one who is behaving aesthetically, increases 
her possibilities of understanding, ie of repositioning towards the 
object of her attention in such a way that enhances the viability of 
her conduct. Aesthetic conduct helps us to find unexpected ways 
(via-: way) through our environment, ie to find alternative means of 
approaching what we are doing and want or need to do, by virtue of 
an alteration of the dynamics of our co-emergence – the mutually 
conditioned constitution of our-selves and our-environment – enabled 
as well by this variety of action. The increased porosity of the subtle 
membrane that simultaneously detaches and connects us allows 
for an altered presence of our world – or at least of the fraction 
that centered our current attention – and with it of our-selves, as 
practicable.
Embodied and situated aesthetic research
I understand artistic research, or better aesthetic research,22 as a line 
of inquiry whose methodology is based on – but not necessarily limited 
to – a mobilization of the cognitive power of aesthetic conduct through 
the organization of this variety of action in practices. Therefore, 
aesthetic research is a field of practice whose social usefulness – its 
raison d’être – is rooted in and corresponds to the cognitive function 
of aesthetic conduct. Consequently, taking my characterization of 
this function in the previous section as a foundation, aesthetic 
research does not produce knowledge but contributes to it – or to 
be more precise, to the configuration of radically new knowledge – by 
facilitating the emergence of its more fundamental conditions of 
possibility through destabilization. In the same way that, according 
to Merleu-Ponty, perception is the fundamental process of intentional 
constitution and consequently all other noematic actions refer 
necessarily to perceptually constituted phenomena – the reason of 
the “primacy of perception”23 – aesthetic research, deeply rooted in 
those organic routines that enable perception, interferes in the most 
basic processes of the emergence of our-world and of our-selves and 
thus in the perceptual and conceptual constitution of all their possible 
particular aspects “of which knowledge always speaks”.24 Aesthetic 
research does not construct but allows the terrain of construction 
to emerge.
20.  I use the term “operative” in relation to Husserl’s concept of “operative intentionality” (“fungierende Intentionalität”). See: Husserl (1955).  
21.  For an interpretation of the concept of “environment” as operative presence, see: Arteaga (2016).
22.  The primary reason for this change of terminology is to considerer its use of aesthetic conduct and not necessarily of procedures of artistic production as the fundamental definitory 
trait of this kind of research. On this basis, aesthetic research exceeds the limits of the art system and is not constrained by its normativity. 
23.  “Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by 
them.”(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xi). In direct reference: Merleau-Ponty (1964).
24.  “To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an 
abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 
p. ix-x, italics in the original).
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These considerations do not imply a subordinated position of 
this kind of research in comparison to other types of inquiry. In 
the framework of embodied and situated cognition, to understand 
the relationships between the different fields of research practices 
in terms of a scale of relevance or of value would be completely 
absurd since each of them are defined and practiced in virtue of 
the system they share and configure. All kinds of research are 
therefore mutually dependent. They configure a system: a sub-
system of our eco-system. They all contribute, by virtue of their 
own specificities and the specific way they are connected to one 
another, to the viability of our common life. Following this systemic 
logic, the relationship between the different types of research 
should not be defined in terms of “application of their results” – this 
might be valid in certain cases like in the relationships of certain 
kinds of scientific research and engineering development – but 
rather through the configuration of frameworks that facilitate 
different research practices to get in touch, to establish mutual 
relationships of contingency (from “contingere”: to touch). These 
frameworks replicate eco-systemic dynamics and allow the specific 
consequences25 of each practice to influence the (re)conception 
and performance of the others. In such a systemic organization 
of the different fields of research practices, which enables their 
spontaneous interlacements on the basis of their respective 
autonomy and their coupling – a non-disciplinary context based on 
connected disciplines – aesthetic research would develop and show 
adequately its specific efficacy in a shared, constantly emerging 
and transformative geography of the common.
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